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 We live in an Age of Federalism.
3
  Of the G 20 countries with the most important 
economies in the world, at least twelve have federal constitutional structures and several 
others are experimenting with federalism and the devolution of power.  The first group 
includes the United States, the European Union, India, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, 
Indonesia, Australia, Russia, Mexico, and South Africa.  The latter group includes the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Italy, and Japan.  Of the 10 countries with the highest GDPs in 
the world, only two – China and France – lack any semblance of a federal structure.  Of the 
world‘s 10 most populous countries, eight have federal or devolutionary structures -- every 
country except for China and Bangladesh.  The only top ten countries by territorial size to 
lack a federal structure are China and Sudan, which recently experienced a secession.   
Though the U.S. invented constitutional federalism only 220 years ago, today it has taken 
the world by storm.  Every major country in the world has some federal structure except 
China and France (a European Union (―EU‖) member).  Nation states worldwide are under 
pressure to surrender power both to growing international entities such as the EU, NAFTA, 
GATT and NATO, and to regional entities as well.  Thus, the EU‘s twenty-seven member 
countries have all surrendered significant powers over trade, commerce, and their economies 
to the confederal EU government.  At the same time, these countries have faced growing 
pressure to devolve power to their national subunits.  Most evidently, the United Kingdom 
has devolved power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland and Spain has devolved power 
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to Catalonia and the Basque region.  Even tiny Belgium has devolved most of its power to 
ethnic subunits in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels.  Federalism limits meanwhile remain 
very constraining in such European countries as Germany and Switzerland.  In North 
America, Canada has surrendered some economic power to NAFTA – a transnational free 
trade association – while surrendering other powers to the increasing assertive province of 
Quebec.  It is not an exaggeration to say that our time is witness to the decline and fall of 
nation states as they dissolve from above and from below.   
The United States has seen a revival of interest in federal limits on national power since 
the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez.4  Beginning in the 1990‘s, 
the Rehnquist Court limited national power in a series of important federalism cases: 
mandatory retirement age for state court judges,
5
 compelling state participation in a federal 
radioactive waste program,
6
 compelling state officers to execute federal gun control laws,
7
 
federal protection of religious freedoms,
8
 and federal protection for women against violence.
9
  
A major issue on the U.S. Supreme Court‘s current agenda is whether President Obama and 
Congress exceeded the scope of national power with a national plan that forces otherwise 
uninsured individuals to buy health insurance.  Constitutional federalism is more vibrant in 
the United States than at any time since the New Deal. 
 This Age of Federalism marks the end of an experiment with nationalism that began with 
the French Revolution‘s rejection of provincial power and endorsement of hyper-
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centralization.  This nationalism experiment gathered steam with Italian and German 
unification in the Nineteenth Century and with the carving up of the Austro-Hungarian and 
Turkish Empires after World War I into dozens of newly independent nation states.  The last 
gasp of nationalism, in retrospect, came when many African and Asian countries that had 
once been Britain‘s and France‘s colonial subjects declared independence.  In the 1950‘s and 
1960‘s, post-colonial nations formed new transnational confederal entities to perform the 
defense and free trade functions that had once been performed by the European empires.  
Ultimately the G-20, NATO, the EU, NAFTA, and GATT fulfilled those needs. 
Fundamentally, the Age of Federalism responds to one of the most urgent questions of 
democratic theory:  What is the proper size of a democracy?  It is all well and good to believe 
the people ought to rule themselves, but at which demos or territorial unit of the people?
10
  Is 
the relevant territorial demos for a resident of Quebec City the Province of Quebec, the 
country of Canada, the whole area covered by NAFTA, or the whole area covered by 
NATO?  The answer varies depending on whether the matter at hand is cultural, economic, 
or related to foreign policy and defense. 
Proponents of democratic theory often ask:  What are the rights of minority groups as 
against the will of the majority?  But this question presupposes we know the appropriate 
territorial unit for addressing the issue.  French speakers may be a majority in the Province of 
Quebec, a powerful minority with constitutional rights in Canada, or a small minority in 
NAFTA and NATO.  Which unit – provincial, national, or international – is the correct one 
to decide a given matter?  We will offer some thoughts on this question below. 
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Dahl & Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (1973); and Alberto Alesina & Enrico 
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Our thesis is that constitutional federalism enforced through judicial review is the correct 
legal response to the demands of the principle of subsidiarity.  Subsidiarity is the idea that 
matters should be decided at the lowest or least centralized competent level of government. 
We understand that subsidiarity grows from the belief that individual rights exist as a matter 
of natural law.  Because rights belong naturally only to individuals, social entities (such as 
families, communities, cities, nations, or confederations) may legislate only to the extent that 
individuals or smaller social units lack competence.  As Professor Daniel Halberstam has 
described it, the principle of subsidiarity holds that: 
the central government should play only a supporting role in 
governance, acting only if the constituent units of government 
are incapable of acting on their own.   The word itself is related 
to the idea of assistance, as in ‗subsidy,‘ and is derived from the 




Subsidiarity ―traces its origins as far back as classical Greece, and [is] later taken up by 
Thomas Aquinas and medieval scholasticism. … [S]ubsequent echoes of it [can be found] in 
the thought of political actors and theorists as varied as Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville, 
Lincoln, and Proudhon.‖12  Subsidiarity first appeared prominently in modern European 
political thought as a result of Catholic teachings in the 1930‘s emphasizing the importance 
of the individual as a rights bearer in an era of fascism and communism.  The papal 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931) provided: 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
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community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a great 
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.  For 
every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the 
members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.
13
 
Or, as the current Catechism of the Catholic Church, says: 
[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in the 
internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter 
of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and 
help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of 
society, always with a view to the common good.
14
   
The principle of subsidiarity formally entered EU law in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and was 
reaffirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon.
15
  Subsidiarity was supposed to reassure small EU member 
state-nations that their rights and powers would be respected when the Council of Ministers 
voting rule switched from unanimity to qualified majority voting.  Presently, subsidiarity in EU 
law appears in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
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 Available in English at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html.  Pius XI‘s 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno 
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of laissez-faire liberal capitalist society and Marxism.  By 1931, ―the political circumstances of 
course were dramtically different, dominated more by the rising threat of totalitarianism than by 
the failure of the state to protect the constituent parts of society.‖  Carozza, supra note __, at 41. 
14 Catechism of the Catholic Church, Para. 1883.  Professor Follesdal argues that Catholic social 
teaching endorses not only subsidiarity but also the obligation of the wealthy to help those who 
are less well off.  We agree with the Church that such a moral obligation exists, but we disagree 
with anyone who has ever suggested socialism as a means of attaining such an objective.  We do 
not cite the Catholic Church here because we agree with all of its teachings.  We don‘t.  We cite 
the Catholic Church on subsidiarity because it happens to be right on that issue.  We agree on the 
question of social justice with John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (2012). 
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sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at [the] central 
level or at [the] regional or [the] local level, but can rather by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at [the] Union level.
16
   
Protocol 30 to the European Community Treaty spells out the EU‘s commitment to 
subsidiarity in more detail.  Suffice it to say that the principle is very important to both EU 
law
17
 and federal constitutions worldwide.   
We believe the correct legal response to the demands of subsidiarity is constitutional 
federalism enforced through substantive judicial review.  Thus, federalism and subsidiarity 
are interrelated themes.  Our argument builds on an important 1994 law review article by 
George A. Bermann called Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:  Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States.
18
  Professor Bermann argued, as we do, for taking 
subsidiarity very seriously,
19
 but we strongly disagree with two of his claims.
20
  First,  
                                                          
16
 Treaty on European Union, art. 5, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247. 
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   The subsidiarity idea was extended to human rights law in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
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 George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:  Federalism in the European Community 
and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994). 
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   There is an extensive literature on subsidiarity aside from Professor Bermann‘s seminal 
article.  See generally Chantal Millon-Delson, L’Etat Subsidiare:  Ingerence et Non-
Ingerence de L’Etate:  Le Principe de Subsidiarite aux Fondements de l’histoire 
Eruopeenne (1992);  Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance:  Proportionality, Subsidiarity, and 
Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (2009); Antonio Estella, The EU 
Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (2002); Andrea Daniel, Subsidiarity in the 
European Community’s Legal Order  (1998); Mariya Pereginets, The Application of the 
Principle of Subsidiarity in EU Law (2010); Simeon Tsetim Iber, The Principle of 
Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Thought (2011); Aurelian Portuese, The Principle of 
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency, 17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 231 (Spring 2011); 
Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States:  Subsidiarity, Private Law, 
and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l Law 369 (2010); Paolo G, Carozza, Subsidiairity as 
a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38 (2003); Denis 
J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism’s Failure:  Subsidiarity in the European Union, 44 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 537 (1996); Gerald L. Neumann, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values:  
Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 Colum. J. Eur. L. 573 (1996); 
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Bermann argues that the European Court of Justice should mainly enforce subsidiarity in the 
EU by forcing policy makers to establish the need for EU-wide laws.  We think Bermann‘s 
approach is too deferential and that the EU would benefit from more vigorous substantive 
enforcement of subsidiarity.  Second, Bermann argues that the subsidiarity idea is totally 
foreign to U.S. Constitutional Law and that the U.S. Supreme Court treats federalism issues 
as if they raise political questions.  Bermann reiterates this claim in a short essay -- also 
published in 1994.
21
  The Supreme Court proved Bermann wrong only a year later with 
United States v. Lopez
22
 in 1995.  Professor Bermann acknowledged the U.S. neo-federalist 
revival in a brief subsequent article, but he neither praises nor criticizes the development nor 
does he explain its deep roots in U.S. constitutional tradition.
23
 
Since 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court has enforced constitutional federalism by striking 
down two laws on Commerce Clause grounds, four laws on the grounds that they exceeded 
federal power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and it has ruled that Congress lacks 
power to make the states liable for money damages because of the constitutional doctrine of 
state sovereign immunity.
24
  Bermann‘s claim is thus no longer sustainable, if it ever was.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
W, Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law – American Federalism 
Compared, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 61 (1995).. 
20
   Subsidiarity in EU law is supplemented by the doctrine of proportionality – a different 
doctrine – by courts may determine whether (1) a measure bears a reasonable relationship to the 
legitimate objective it is meant to implement; (2) that the costs of the measure do not manifestly 
outweigh the benefits; and (3) that the measure represents the least burdensome solution to the 
problem identified.  Id. at 386. 
21
   George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity as a Principle of U.S. Constitutional Law,  42 Am. J. of 
Comp. L. 555 (1994). 
22
   514 U.S. 649 (1995). 
23
   George A. Bermann, The Lisbon Treaty:  The Irish No.  National Parliaments and 
Subsidiarity: An Outsiuders View, 4 European Constitutional Law Review 453 (2008). 
24
  See TAN infra at notes __ to __. 
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Additionally, the Supreme Court‘s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,25 the law of federal 
jurisdiction,
26
 theoretical concerns underlying the law of federal preemption
27
 and perhaps 
subsidiarity concerns with present federal conflict of law rules
28
 belie Bermann‘s claim.  As 
the litigation over President Obama‘s health care plan shows, constitutional federalism is 
alive and well on the U.S. Supreme Court, contrary to Bermann‘s 1994 article. 
To defend the thesis that constitutional federalism enforced through substantive judicial 
review is the correct legal response to the demands of subsidiarity, we focus primarily on the 
United States over the last 221 years because it is the longest functioning federal regime and 
because of the post-1995 federalist revival.
29
  We do not claim that the original 
understanding of the U.S. Constitution-as-amended always corresponds to the economically 
efficient design of competing jurisdictions and to the justificiatory theory of subsidiarity.  We 
do claim that reading the present-day doctrinal tests with an eye to what we call the 
Economics of Federalism provides the best understanding of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
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   They key article here which Bermann does not cite is:  Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court 
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26
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 ed. 1990). 
27
   Stephen F. Williams, Preemption:  First Principles, 103 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 323 
(2009). 
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Law, and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 369 (2010) describing how there are more 
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 This paper will proceed in four parts.  Part I will summarize the Economics of Federalism 
and of subsidiarity and will explain when activities are best conducted at a lower or higher 
level of government.  Part II will address the U.S. Constitution‘s enumerated national powers 
in light of the Economics of Federalism and of subsidiarity.  Part III will address the national 
constraints the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes on the States, again 
in light of the Economics of Federalism and of subsidiarity.  Part IV concludes. 
I.  The Economics of Federalism and of Subsidiarity 
Economics teaches us some simple but fundamental truths about when government 
decision-making is best done at the state or local level vs, the national level.  Although 
Professor Calabresi has discussed this topic in three prior publications, it is necessary to 
briefly describe the Economics of Federalism before we discuss subsidiarity.
31
   
                                                          
30
   See also Aurelian Portuese taking a similar but not identical view, supra note __.  Our 
approach could help correct for some of the erroneous, cartel-empowering outcomes that 
Michael Greve documents vividly in his important new book The Upside-Down Constitution.  
Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down Constitution (2012). 
31
 Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American 
Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2011); Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist 
Court: A Normative Defense, ANNALS, AM. ASS’N POL. & SOC. SCI. 24-36 (Mar. 2001); Steven 
G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”:  In Defense of United States 
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995).  Professor Calabresi‘s articles build on prior work done 
in:  David Shapiro, Federalism:  A Dialogue (1995); Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 
(1972); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956); 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 University of 
Chicago Law Review1484 (1987); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the 
Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 555 (1994).  See also 
Williams, supra note __ (calling for a reconceptualization of federal preemption law in light of 
the Economics of Federalism).  Professor Calabresi‘s understanding of this subject grew out of 
lengthy conversations with his then colleague, Professor Thomas W. Merrill. 
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A.   The Advantages of State Lawmaking  
Restricting lawmaking to the state or provincial level in any federation has at least four 
obvious advantages: 1) regional variation in preferences, 2) competition for taxpayers and 
businesses, 3) experimentation to develop the best set of rules, and 4) lower monitoring costs. 
First, tastes, preferences, and real world conditions may often differ between territories in 
a large, continental-sized democracy.  For example, some states like Alaska or Montana with 
a very low population density may prefer a higher speed limit for automobiles than a high-
density state like New Jersey.  If the national government decides all speed limits, the result 
may be too low for Alaska and too high for New Jersey.  In contrast, if speed limits are 
decided at the state level, each state can tailor its speed limit to conform to local tastes, 
preferences, and real world conditions.  Such a federal outcome will generally lead to higher 
overall levels of social utility assuming everything else is held equal.  Thus, the first 
economic argument for smaller decision-making units is that they can better accommodate 
geographically varying tastes, preferences, and real world conditions.
32
 
Second, in a federal system where states make certain decisions, the states compete for 
people, taxpayers, businesses, and other financial resources to the extent that property and 
persons are fully mobile (which is not always the case).  Each state offers a different bundle 
of public goods, levels of taxation, and government services.  Residents weigh these bundles 
to decide whether to stay put or to move if another state offers a perceived superior bundle.  
This argument is today most associated with Charles M. Tiebout.
33
  As an example, consider 
the States of Texas and New York.  Texas and New York‘s different levels of taxation and 
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government services reflect different philosophies about the role of government.  Recently, 
people and businesses have been moving to Texas and away from New York; arguably, this 
competition among the States has been typical of American federalism.  Monopoly providers 
are often inefficient and dismissive of consumer preferences.  The same holds true for 
government monopoly providers of bundles of public goods.  Therefore, competition among 
states is better if everything else is equal and property and persons are fully mobile.
34
  
Language and cultural differences reduce mobility in the European Union.  It is easier for an 
American to move from Virginia to California than it is for an Italian to move to the U.K. 
Professor Follesdal notes that some federal governments, like Germany‘s, modify the 
competition among the States (called Laander), by redistributing wealth to some degree from 
richer to poorer States.  Canada, the United States, and the European Union have have done 
this to a lesser extent as well.  But as the recent Greek debt crisis shows, the willingness of 
federal entities like Germany to subsidize inefficient monopoly providers of governmental 
services is limited, even in the EU.  In a true federal system, inefficient state governments 
will pay a price for tax and regulatory excesses and mismanagement.  This is a concrete 
benefit of constitutional federalism.   
A third Economics of Federalism argument for state-level decisionmaking is that states 
will continually experiment with new bundles of services to attract new taxpayers and 
businesses.  As Justice Brandeis famously said in his 1932 dissent in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann: 
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To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught 
with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State, may 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economics experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
35
 
Currently, the fifty United States are experimenting with legalizing gay marriage, allowing 
assisted suicide, and legalizing medical marijuana use.  These experiments are beneficial for 
the country.  Experimentation and competition among the States thus support reserving 
decision-making power to the state level. 
 Finally, monitoring state officials as compared to national officials may cost less.  The 
smaller territorial size of state legislative districts may produce greater congruence between 
the mores of the legislators and the people.
36
  Also, the people may more easily physically 
observe and question government officials in close proximity rather than many miles away.  
Local officials may thus avoid what has been called an ―inside-the-beltway mentality.‖  
Large, multi-layered bureaucracies cannot efficiently process new information -- neither in 
government nor in the private sector -- as Friedrich Hayek shows in Law, Legislation, and 
Liberty and Thomas Sowell shows in Knowledge and Decisions.
37
  Federalism avoids 
overly centralized, top–down command and control mechanisms which national governments 
might otherwise tend to favor. 
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37
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(contrasting the efficiency in processing dispersed economic information of spontaneous systems 
of order, like markets, with the inefficiency of planned systems of order like those that exist in 
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In our judgment, these four arguments for leaving governmental decision-making 
power at the state or provincial level establish a presumption in favor of state over national 
decision-making.  This presumption gives effect to the principle of subsidiarity, discussed 
above.  As the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931) says, ―it is an injustice and at the 
same time a great evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.‖  As the Encyclical adds: 
For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of 
the body social, and never destroy and absorb them. … Therefore, those in power 
should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various 
associations, in observance of the principle of ―subsidiary function,‖ the stronger 
social authority and effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the 
condition of the State. 
38
 
The Economics of Federalism helps us better understand when States and 
Provinces should act without federal or transnational intervention.  Unless one of the 
arguments for national power described below applies, a matter ought to be decided at the 
state or provincial level. 
B.    The Advantages of National Lawmaking 
There are at least four arguments for allowing a national government to legislate and 
preempt state lawmaking power in some circumstances. 
First, sometimes there are substantial economies of scale in undertaking an activity or 
financing a program only once rather than fifty times.
39
  Surely economies of scale may be 
realized as a result, for example, of one federal space program rather than fifty separate 
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   Le Bouef, supra note __, at 565-66. 
15 
 
programs.  There are probably economies of scale in most national defense and foreign 
policy activities.  One danger is that rent seeking efforts at regulatory capture may be 
rewarded more fully at the federal level because federal capture is more likely to yield rents 
in the absence of competing jurisdictions.  This cost must be weighed against the benefits 
from economies of scale or otherwise that may be available when national governments act.
40
 
Second, national action can overcome the high costs of collective action that the States 
would otherwise face.
 41
  It would be very time-consuming and expensive for the fifty States 
to act collectively on foreign policy, or defense, or national economic policy.  Some States 
might refuse to join in policies that a majority of States representing a majority of the people 
endorse.  Such hold out States might trigger a race-to-the-bottom and cause the legal standard 
of the most permissive state to forcing all other States to comply, even if a majority of the 
nation wished otherwise.
42
  An example is no-fault divorce law; Nevada‘s easy divorce 
policies ultimately set a national standard.  The states also famously raced to the bottom by 
allowing child labor in the first decades of the Twentieth Century.  Federal action can stop 
races to the bottom and can overcome collective action problems, which is major justification 
for federal power in some circumstances. 
Third, national action may be necessary if the States‘ activities generate serious external 
costs on out of state residents.
43
  For example, when a state pollutes the air or the water and 
downwind states bear the burden, the polluting state may need incentives to reduce pollution.  
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If a state could realize the economic benefits of a factory while the costs of its pollution fell 
mostly on other states, the polluting state would have no incentive to clean up its act.  
National regulation of clean air and water is thus essential to correct for the externalities 
problem.  Other circumstances may also necessitate national lawmaking when state action 
negatively affects other States. 
Fourth, the national government is better at handling civil rights issues than are the 
States.
44
  James Madison first predicted this phenomenon in The Federalist No. 10 where he 
noted that the legislature of a large continental democracy would represent many more 
factions or interest groups than a small democratic city state.
45
  Therefore it is less likely that 
a permanent, oppressive majority coalition will capture the legislature of a large federation 
than that it might capture the legislature of a member unit of the federation.  There are more 
interest groups vying to capture Congress than vie to capture the Illinois legislature so it is 
harder to form and hold together a permanent entrenched majority coalition.  Also, discrete 
and insular minorities face lower organizational costs in lobbying Congress than are faced by 
the so-called silent majority nationwide.  Part of the reason national majorities are ―silent‖ is 
because it is so hard and expensive for them to organize.
46
 
As Madison predicted in The Federalist No. 10, the U.S. national government has in fact 
been much more protective of the civil rights of minority groups than the States.  Congress 
freed the slaves, helped to end segregation, and was the first institution to protect the 
women‘s equal rights in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Federal action is thus warranted when a 
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matter concerns fundamental civil rights.  Federal action may also be needed if state laws 
infringe on immobile property, like real estate, or on people who may find it overly 
burdensome to move, like the elderly. 
One difficulty is that one person‘s fundamental civil rights issue may be another person‘s 
instance where varying tastes and cultural preferences favor state level decisionmaking.  
There is no easy answer to this problem.  In general, we must fall back on practical wisdom 
and common sense to try to decide whether the issue implicates fundamental civil rights or 
varying tastes and cultural preferences.  Decision-makers should approach this problem in a 
spirit of tolerance and of willingness to ―live and let live.‖ 
C.  How the Number of States in a Federation Affects the Balance 
The U.S. federation has grown from thirteen States at the Founding to fifty States today.  
How has this affected the Economics of Federalism and of subsidiarity?  In general, increases 




In a fifty state federation, it is more likely that different States will reflect differing tastes, 
cultural preferences, and real world conditions than a thirteen state federation.  A fifty state 
federation will also be more competitive than a thirteen state federation.  There will also be 
more experimentation in a fifty state federation than there is in a thirteen state federation.  
And, finally, state governments ought to be easier to monitor in a fifty state federation, at 
least if everything else is held equal.   
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Conversely, in a fifty state federation, there will be more circumstances that would 
benefit from economies of scale at the national level.  The costs of collective action are also 
higher if there are fifty States instead of thirteen, so this rationale also suggests the need for 
more federal power as the number of States increases.  Fifty States also generate more 
externalities both because there are more States taking actions that might have external 
effects and because there are more States that might experience a negative external effect.  
Finally, a fifty state federation is likely to be even better at protecting civil rights because it 
will likely contain even more interest groups, which makes the likelihood of a self-dealing 
majority coalition less likely.  In sum, the increase in the number of States in the U.S. 
federation from thirteen to fifty has led to a kind of hyper-federalism where both the 
economic case for leaving things at the state level and the economic case for handling things 
at the national level become augmented. 
Is the optimal number of States thirteen, as at the Founding, or fifty, as we have today?  
We think the answer is probably between twenty and thirty.
48
  Federations with too few 
States may have big or populous States that can realistically threaten secession to hold up the 
federation for special benefits.  Canada with only ten provinces, one of which is Quebec, has 
too few States.  On the other hand, the fifty U.S. States are so weak and powerless relative to 
the central government that too much centralization occurs.  The necessary balance of power 
in a federation counsels for between twenty and thirty States.  The EU, with twenty-seven 
member nations, and the G 20 economies, with twenty member nations, are both optimally 
sized federal or confederal entities. 
D. Balance:  Decentralization versus Federalism 
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To sum, there is a strong economic case for presumptively leaving power at the state 
level unless the presumption is trumped by evidence that:  1) there are economies of scale to 
national action; 2) the States are suffering from a collective action problem; 3) the States are 
imposing negative external costs on their neighbors; or 4) there is a bona fide fundamental 
civil rights issue that is at stake.  The economics of federalism thus sheds light on the 
subsidiarity principle discussed above.  Subsidiarity suggests that power ought to be left 
presumptively at the state level unless the advocates of federal action can show an economics 
of federalism need for national intervention.  The Economics of Federalism thus elaborates 
and gives content to the EU and Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity.  Subsidiarity is desirable 
not because it maximizes utility, although it may often do that, but because it recognizes the 
natural right of individuals to have their problems addressed by the level of government that 
is closest to them.
49
  It respects individual, natural rights.  EU and U.S. courts enforcing 
federalism limits on national power should consider economics in determining matters that 
are inherently state and local and matters that require the aid of a national or transnational 
government. 
A second conclusion is that federalism inherently calls for some balance between state 
and national power.  Sometimes it will be a close judgment call as to whether the economic 
arguments for state level or national action predominate.  Federalism is neither the same 
thing as nationalism nor is it the same thing as States rights.  Federalism is inherently about 
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Third, the analysis thus far has implications for national Supreme Courts enforcing vague 
human rights guarantees in national constitutions or in transnational conventions on human 
rights.  Those courts must balance the need to protect fundamental human rights with the fact 
that tastes, cultural preferences, and real world conditions may differ at the state level in the 
U.S. or at the national state level in the EU or among the countries that are signatories to the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  The economics of federalism thus has implications 
for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the U.S.
51
 and for the margin of appreciation 
doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights.
52
  We will come back to this subject in Part 
III below.  
Finally, some American critics of constitutional federalism have suggested that the 
economic arguments presented above counsel in favor of decentralization at the grace of the 
national government.
53
  We disagree.
54
  The problem is it is too easy for the national 
government to legislate in circumstances where it ought to defer to the States because 
Congress and the President are self interested national actors.  Ensuring the right balance 
requires a constitutional federal structure such that neither the central government nor the 
States are the sole judges of what gets nationalized and what is left to the States.  It is a 
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fundamental maxim of Anglo-American constitutional law that no man ought to be a judge in 
his own cause.
55
  The advocates of decentralization over constitutional federalism would 
wrongly make the national government the judge of the extent of its own powers vis a vis the 
States. 
In his landmark 1994 article, Bermann identifies six values that he thinks are protected by 
constitutional federalism and subsidiarity.
56
  Bermann argues that:  (1) self determination and 
accountability are enhanced by constitutional federalism to the extent it requires that 
decisions be made at levels of government where people are effectively represented;
57
 (2) 
political liberty is enhanced if power is constitutionally fragmented rather than being merely 
decentralized at the grace of a national government;
58
 (3) subsidiarity makes government 
more flexible and responsive to the real needs of the people it serves;
59
 (4) constitutional 
federalism helps preserve local social and cultural identity – an identity that often has deep 
historical roots and that is thus important;
60
 (5) constitutional federalism and subsidiarity 
foster diversity which ―may be valued in its own right;‖61 and (6) constitutional federalism 
may reinforce local, city, and county power in the component states of a federation.
62
   
We agree with Bermann on all six of these points, most especially the argument that 
constitutional federalism and subsidiarity fragment political power in a way that mere 
decentralization does not do.  We believe with Lord Acton that ―[p]ower tends to corrupt, 
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and absolute power corrupts absolutely,‖63 and we think this counsels in favor of 
constitutional federalism and checks and balances rather than merely decentralization.  We 
would add that constitutional federalism and subsidiarity might be more appealing to skeptics 
than to Cartesian rationalists because the former may instinctly value experimentation and 
competition and disfavor a one size fits all approach.  As admirers of the empiricism and 
practicality of the Scottish Enlightenment, we feel drawn to federalism on these grounds as 
well. 
Federal Supreme Courts enforcing subsidiarity guarantees in light of the Economics of 
Federalism ought to be deferential to nation/international law-making bodies.  Such courts 
should strike down federal laws once every ten years, not ten times every year, so as to guard 
against too much judicial policy-making.  They ought to invalidate national/international 
laws often enough to remind politicians that subsidiarity concerns are real and must be 
respected. 
II.   The U.S. Constitution’s Enumeration of Powers and Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity, as illuminated by the Economics of Federalism, suggests 
that the need for some constitutional federalism is rooted in the very nature of things (i.e., in 
Natural Law for those of us who believe in such a thing).  It is highly unlikely that any 
territorially large or populous country would not benefit greatly from a federal system.  The 
need for federalism is thus a fundamental fact of human existence.  The reason for this Age 
of Federalism and vibrant discussion of subsidiarity is precisely that constitutional federalism 
and subsidiarity respond to essential aspects of the human condition.  We would expect the 
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U.S. constitutional structure to protect both ideas, then, since the U.S. is the world‘s oldest 
and longest functioning democratic federation. 
So far, we have commented on the economic nature of the concepts of federalism and 
subsidiarity as they have developed historically in the United States, but we have not yet 
explained how these two concepts ought to affect American constitutional law.   We now 
offer a perspective from American constitutional law on the relevance of judicially enforced 
subsidiarity.  To reiterate, we believe that constitutional federalism enforced through judicial 
review is the correct legal response to the demands of subsidiarity.  In Part A, we discuss 
recent arguments for and against judicial enforcement of federalism in the U.S.; in Part B, we 
show how the Framers infused the Constitution with the idea of subsidiarity; and in Part C, 
we discuss the caselaw involving Enumerated Federal Powers, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, Intergovernmental Immunities, and Preemption all of which shows that judicial 
enforcement of subsidiarity is ongoing in U.S. constitutional law.  We do not claim that the 
U.S. caselaw as it presently stands produces all the gains that might be ideal, but we do claim 
that it achieves many such gains. 
A.   Judicial Enforcement of Federalism in the U.S. 
How is constitutional federalism protected in U.S. constitutional law today?  The primary 
protection no doubt is that both Houses of Congress and the President must approve of 
federal laws or, if the President does not approve, only two thirds of the House and the 
Senate may a presidential veto.  This onerous process of bicameralism and presentment for 
federal lawmaking, coupled with such add-ons as the Senate filibuster, helps make federal 
law the exception and not the rule.  As a result, many areas of law remain mostly at the state 
24 
 
level, even after 223 years of American federalism.  This is true of tort law, family law, 
contract law, property law, and criminal law.   
Judicial review, as exercised by the U.S. Supreme Court, also vigorously protects 
constitutional federalism.  In Federal Enumerated Power Cases, Dormant Commerce Clause 
cases, Preemption Cases, and Intergovernmental Immunity Cases alike, the present Supreme 
Court has not hesitated to enforce constitutional limits against Congress‘s efforts to 
aggrandize its power.
64
  From 1954 to the early 1990‘s, commentators sometimes claimed 
that federal courts did not have power to review limits on national enumerated powers 
because federalism cases raise political questions.  Thus, Professors Jesse Choper and 
Herbert Wechsler argued that because the States are powerfully represented in Congress, 
political safeguards would protect federalism and obviate the need for judicial review in 
enumerated powers federalism cases.  Choper believed that judicial review was more 
necessary in individual rights cases than in enumerated powers cases, and he urged the 
Supreme Court to spend all of its political capital in the former rather than the latter. 
The Choper-Wechsler Theory prevailed 5 to 4 in the Garcia case
65
 in 1985, but it was 
decisively rejected in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
66
 New York v. United States,
67
 and United States 
v. Lopez
68
and its progeny in the 1990‘s.  Over the last twenty years, a majority of five 
justices have consistently believed the Supreme Court ought to decide enumerated powers 
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cases, even though four justices may have dissented for Choperian reasons.  The Supreme 
Court is right to hear and decide enumerated powers cases for several reasons.
69
 
First, the enumeration of federal powers is as much a part of our written Constitution as is 
the Bill of Rights.  The Marbury v. Madison
70
 argument for judicial review thus applies in 
federalism cases just as it applies in individual rights cases.  When Congress passes a law 
that unconstitutionally aggrandizes national power, it is the Supreme Court‘s duty to hold up 
that statute against the Constitution and to follow the Constitution where there is a conflict.   
Scholars have long recognized that judicial umpiring for federalism guarantees is 
centrally important to the global spread of judicial review.
71
  Constitutional Courts and 
Supreme Courts often begin as federalism umpires and later expand to protect individual 
rights, as happened in the United States.  Historically, Canadian and Australian courts 
enforced their Commerce Clause analogues very vigorously,
72
 and the German Constitutional 
Court has done the same.
73
 In the British Empire, the Privy Council in London enforced 
imperial federal allocations of power between Britain and its colonies and, in Canada, 
between the provinces and the national government.  Ample precedent worldwide favors 
judicial umpiring in federalism cases – precedent which Bermann overlooks in his 1994 
subsidiarity article.   
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The text of the U.S. Constitution demands that the courts play such a role and that role is 
played by courts as well in Germany, Canada, Australia, India, and South Africa.  Just as 
Federalism has spread all over the world, judicial enforcement of federalism has spread all 
over the world as well.  Judicial review in federalism or subsidiarity cases is sometimes 
deferential
74
 but it does take place and has had widespread consequences.
75
  Bermann himself 
identifies possible politically accountable bodies for policing subsidiarity in the EU context 
in his short 2008 essay on National Parliaments and Subsidiarity:  An Outsiders View.
76
 
Second, abdication to Congress in all U.S. federalism, enumerated powers cases as 
Professors Jesse Choper and Herbert Wechsler call for would make Congress the judge of the 
scope of Congress‘s own powers.  This is a form of putting the fox in charge of the hen 
house.  It would quite improperly make Congress the judge in its own cause as to the scope 
of national congressional power.  As Bermann recognizes, in the EU there are almost no 
political safeguards of nation state power against the EU
77
 so there, especially, a more active 
judicial role in enforcing subsidiarity would be desirable.  The political institutions of a 
national or transnational entity cannot safely be entrusted with the power to determine the 
scope of national or transnational powers.  If federalism and subsidiarity are valuable, as we 
have argued they are, then they need to be enforced by a powerful independent entity like a 
Constitutional or Supreme Court. 
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There is no real danger that the U.S. Supreme Court will excessively limit national power 
in enumerated powers federalism cases.  The nine Supreme Court justices are selected by the 
nationally elected President and by senators elected statewide, all of whom are national 
officers paid out from U.S. Treasury.  It is extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court would 
long challenge a national majority sentiment -- a point made decades ago by Professors 
Robert Dahl and Gerry Rosenberg.
78
  It is more likely that the Court might deferentially 
uphold laws that it ought to strike down, thus giving those laws an undeserved patina of 
legitimacy.
79
  Supreme Court enforcement of enumerated powers thus poses small risks 
while offering substantial benefits.
80
 
Third, a democracy‘s greatest challenge with the institution of judicial review is that it 
generates a counter-majoritarian difficulty.  A tiny group of life-tenured judges have 
authority to disallow, for example, a popular law banning indecent speech on the Internet 
because it violates the First Amendment.  This counter-majoritarian difficulty is always 
present in individual rights cases, but to a lesser degree in federalism cases.  When the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act in United States v. 
Lopez, for example, it did not preclude Texas from passing a similar law at the state level.
81
  
The Court held simply that state-level majorities could constitutionally address guns in 
schools, but a national majority could not.
82
  United States v. Lopez was thus not a counter-
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majoritarian decision like Roe v. Wade.
83
  It was simply a decision that the majority with 
proper jurisdiction to legislate was at the state level and not the national level.
84
 
Fourth, Professor Choper and his acolytes often argue that questions about the scope of 
national power or the Economics of Federalism are inherently normative and require an 
expertise which is lacking in the Supreme Court.  This claim is also incorrect.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has historically enforced the Economics of Federalism in so-called Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases, and its efforts in this field have been almost universally praised.
85
  
In Dormant Commerce Clause cases, the Supreme Court strikes down state laws that 
discriminate against or unreasonably burden interstate commerce even if Congress has not 
yet legislated in the field.  The Court thus uses economics to decide whether a state law 
intrudes on the national economic domain or whether its impact is exclusively local.
86
  This 
economics of federalism analysis is no different from what the Supreme Court entertained in 
United States v. Lopez. 
Finally, Professors Choper‘s and Wechsler‘s arguments about the political safeguards of 
American federalism simply no longer hold true in the United States, much less than in the 
EU.  Wechsler argued, for example, that malaportionment of House seats in the 1950‘s gave 
the state huge power over Congress.  Malaportionment, however, bit the dust in the U.S. way 
back in the 1960‘s as the result of the Supreme Court‘s one person, one vote decisions in 
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 and Reynolds v. Sims.
88
  Campaign finance reforms in the meantime have led 
Representatives and Senators to raise most campaign funds in increments of less than $2,500 
from national interest groups, whose members mostly live outside the election district.  This 
tends to mean that elected Representatives and Senators share views with national special 
interests as much as their districts or States.  We doubt the political safeguards of federalism 
were ever as great as Wechsler and Choper claimed they were, but, whatever such safeguards 
may once have existed, they no longer exist today.
89
   
In sum, a polity that wants to garner the economic benefits of federalism and subsidiarity 
needs to constitutionally protect those concepts in a written Constitution that is enforced by 
judicial review.  Decentralization at the grace of the national government leads to over-
centralization, which is costly, and the absence of judicial review to enforce federalism and 
subsidiarity ideas leads to the same pitfall.  Happily, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
understood these points and so in 1787 they enumerated and limited national power in a 
document which the federal courts have the power to enforce.  We will now turn to the 
historical origins and subsequent development of subsidiarity in U.S. constitutional law. 
B.   Subsidiarity, the Philadelphia Convention, and Two Centuries of 
Practice 
In order to understand fully subsidiarity‘s relevance to U.S. constitutional law, it is 
necessary to begin with the enumeration of federal power in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The Framers of the Constitution were quite familiar with a rudimentary instinct 
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as to the Economics of Federalism even though they did not use that term or understand the 
concept as well as we do today.
90
 
Between May and September of 1787, a constitutional convention of fifty-five delegates 
drafted the U.S. Constitution.  The delegates met in secret in Philadelphia, but thanks to 
James Madison‘s copious notes and other records we know a fair bit about the Convention‘s 
deliberations and the delegates‘ understanding of the Article I, Section 8 enumeration of 
powers. 
Before the Philadelphia Convention, the Virginia delegates, led by James Madison, met 
and drafted the so-called Virginia Plan as to what the new constitution ought to look like.  
This plan is sometimes referred to as the Randolph Plan because Virginia Governor Edmund 
Randolph presented it early on to the Philadelphia Convention.  Resolution 6 of the Virginia 
Plan addressed the scope of the new federal government‘s power.  This Resolution proposed 
a two branch Congress, and it said: 
6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of 
originating Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be 
impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress bar 
the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the 
separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, 
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles 
of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst any member 
of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof. 
91
 
The Virginia Plan then openly proposed to give Congress: 1) the same very limited powers it 
had enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation; 2) the power to legislate in all cases to 
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which the separate States are incompetent; 3) the power to legislate in cases where the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; 
and 4) the power to negative all state laws that contravened the Constitution in Congress‘s 
opinion.
92
  In addition, the eleventh resolution of the Virginia Plan gave the national 




 The Virginia Plan is striking because it essentially proposes to give the national 
government the power to act in cases where the States face collective action problems and 
are separately ―incompetent to act,‖ i.e. where there are economies of scale, and where state 
laws have major external effects that disrupt the harmony of the Union.  The Virginia Plan 
does not use such modern economic terms as ―collective action problem,‖ or ―economy of 
scale,‖ or correction of ―negative externalities,‖ but this seems pretty plainly to be what the 
Plan‘s authors aimed to say.  James Madison, and the Virginia delegations, understood at a 
gut level that States could not carry out some activities on their own and that a federal 
government that should act in those unusual and limited situations. 
The Virginia Plan was not the last word on the scope of national power, however.  The 
small States, led by New Jersey, resisted giving the federal government the powers specified 
in the Virginia Plan.  New Jersey put forward a plan of its own that categorically limited and 
enumerated national power.
94
  The New Jersey Plan contemplates a national government 
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which has very limited and categorically enumerated powers and which cannot correct all 
collective action problems or negative externalities imposed by state laws. 
 The Philadelphia Convention argued back and forth for weeks over the merits of the 
Virginia and New Jersey Plans, and eventually reached a Great Compromise that 
incorporated parts of both plans.  States were equally represented in the Senate but 
population size determined representation in the House of Representatives.  The Bedford 
Resolution was the Philadelphia Convention‘s final resolution the on the scope of national 
power before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style for drafting.  It was 
introduced by Rep. Gunning Bedford, of Delaware, and it provided: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1. Resd. that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, 
corrected & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution 
adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of 
the Union. 
2. Resd. that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in Congress, by the 
present existing articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts for 
raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of 
foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps 
on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages passing 
through the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they 
shall deem proper & expedient; to make rules & regulations for the collection 
thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in such manner as they 
shall think proper: to pass Acts for the regulation of trade & commerce as well 
with foreign nations as with each other: provided that all punishments, fines, 
forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for contravening such acts rules and 
regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law Judiciaries of the State in 
which any offence contrary to the true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & 
regulations shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing 
in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose in the superior 
common law Judiciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction of all 
errors, both in law & fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of 
the U. States.   
Resolution three of the New Jersey Plan goes on to give Congress specific power to requisition 
funds from the States, power which Congress lacked under the Articles of Confederation.    New 




[T]he national legislature ought to posses the legislative rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation [and the right] to legislate 
in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those 
to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the 




Here, the Philadelphia Convention endorsed the Virginia Plan‘s Economics of Federalism 
intuition as to the scope of the power of the new federal government.  Judge Stephen 
Williams, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, reached much the same 
conclusion after Professor Calabresi called this legislative history to his attention.
96
  The 
Bedford Resolution dropped James Madison‘s proposal to give Congress the power to 
negative state laws, however.  Bermann does not discuss this history in claiming that the 
subsidiarity idea has no roots in U.S. constitutional law. 
 The Committee on Style of course had no authority to make substantive changes or 
decisions in drafting the U.S. Constitution; its charge was only to mechanically reduce 
resolutions like the Bedford Resolution to a legal text.  The Committee on Style adopted 
constitutional text for Article I, Section 8 that was quite different from the Economics of 
Federalism text approved as the Bedford Resolution.  As Professor Kurt Lash notes, the 
Committee on Style opted instead for a categorical approach to federalism in which the 
national government was given power in certain categories of situations.
97
  National power 
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was extended to the following categories:  1) taxing and spending to promote the general 
welfare; 2)  borrowing money; 3) regulating interstate and foreign commerce; 4) passing 
naturalization and bankruptcy laws; 5) coining money and regulating the standard of weights 
and measures; 6) punishing counterfeiting; 7) establishing post offices and post roads 8) 
establishing patents and copyrights; 9) creating lower federal courts; 10) punishing piracy 
and offense against the law of nations; 11) all powers over foreign policy and the waging of 
war including the power to raise armies and navies; 12) power to legislate for the District of 
Columbia and the territories; 13) power to guarantee to the States a republican form of 
government; and finally 14) power to adopt all necessary and proper laws for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers. 
When the Constitution was up for ratification, many people argued – rightly in retrospect 
– that the broad enumerated powers generally, and the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
particular, would give Congress sweeping power to act to solve collective action problems.  
Fearful of that outcome, the Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution insisted on adding 
the Bill of Rights to the document as the first order of business of the new national 
government.  Representative James Madison, serving in the First Congress, promptly drafted 
the Bill of Rights and included this federalism protection in the Tenth Amendment: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the national government especially broad leeway when it is attempting to solve a state collective 
action problem.  If Professor Lash were right about the meaning of Article I, Section 8, the Clean Air 
and Clean Water Acts would be unconstitutional along with the immigration laws, paper money, the 
federal labor laws, and aspects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  It is well settled as a matter of stare 
decisis that the laws mentioned above are all constitutional and that the federal government can act to 
solve genuine state collective action problems. 
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The powers not delegated by the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.
98
 
This provision hardly protected the States from ever-expanding federal power because it did not 
enumerate the reserved powers of the States over such topics as manufacturing, mining, 
agriculture, education, criminal law, and regulation of local health and safety.  The Tenth 
Amendment was thus easily dismissed as stating a truism – all is retained which is not delegated 
– as the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly held in United States v. Darby Lumber Co., where the 
manufacturing regulation at issue was a necessary and proper means for carrying into execution 
Congress‘s commerce power.99   
Some have argued that the Tenth Amendment suggests that the Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty and that it makes the states co-sovereign together with the national government.  We 
do not buy that argument and would note that the Tenth Amendment does not use the word 
sovereignty any more than did Article I, Section 8.  We agree with Paolo Carozza that the 
sovereignty idea is inconsistent with the idea of subsidiarity and that it is an unhelpful idea at 
best.
100
  In any event, sovereignty under the U.S. Constitution lies not with the States or the 
federal government but with We the People of the United States who made the Constitution by a 
majority vote of three quarters of the states that sent representatives to the Philadelphia 
Convention.  Article V requires a majority in three quarters of the States to acquiesce to changes 
to the Constitution, so it seems sovereignty must lie at that threshold.  From 1789 to the present, 
the Supreme Court has consistently read the Constitution as giving the federal government the 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause ―to legislate in all cases for the general interests of 
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the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.‖101  
The categorical listing of powers in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 to 17 did not prevent the 
Supreme Court from reading the Constitution as if it had enacted the words of the Bedford 
Resolution rather than a categorical enumeration of powers. 
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld laws regulating navigation in intercoastal waterways – 
laws that Chief Justice Marshall said were constitutional in Gibbons v. Ogden.
102
  Federal 
navigation laws governing intercoastal waters are appropriate under an Economics of Federalism 
approach, but they are harder to justify under the categorical federalism of Article I, Section 8.
103
  
Arguably, Congress can regulate even recreational navigation or intrastate navigation under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause if it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but if Congress 
can do that the effort to limit federal power categorically is a failure. 
The U.S. Supreme Court read the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, holding that Congress had the implied power to charter a national bank of the United 
States because doing so was a convenient, useful, and appropriate means of executing such 
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enumerated powers as the powers of taxation, spending, regulation of commerce, and the raising 
of armies.
104
  Chief Justice Marshall said: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adopted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
105
 
Note that Marshall‘s test in McCulloch replaces the Constitution‘s categorical textual 
requirement that means be ―necessary and proper‖ with the weasily requirement that they be 
merely ―appropriate.‖106  McCulloch v. Maryland implied a greatly expanded sphere of federal 
power and the ―appropriateness‖ inquiry almost invites a consideration of the Economics of 
Federalism.  McCulloch is striking because the Framers at Philadelphia had specifically 
considered -- and decided against -- empowering the federal government to charter corporations.  
John Marshall almost certainly knew this history when he authored McCulloch. 
 In two post-Civil War cases, the Supreme Court built on McCulloch‘s foundation for a 
sweeping understanding of national power.  In Knox v. Lee, the Court held that Congress had 





a striking decision because Congress has a categorically enumerated power to ―coin‖ money 
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 5.
109
  That power is superfluous if the Necessary and Proper 
Clause provides Congress the power to print paper money – something James Madison railed 
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against at the end of The Federalist No. 10.
110
  The Supreme Court also followed an Economics 
of Federalism non-categorical approach in its 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
holding Congress had power to expel long-time resident aliens under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
111
  This implied national power over immigration generally goes well beyond Congress‘s 
enumerated power to pass naturalization laws.  Fong Yue Ting, like Knox v. Lee, is compatible 
with an Economics of Federalism approach, but not with a categorical approach to federalism. 
 The Supreme Court famously rejected categorical federalism in favor of an Economics of 
Federalism approach in The Shreveport Rate Cases, decided in 1914.  In that series of cases the 
Court considered whether the Interstate Commerce Commission could regulate wholly intrastate 
rates along interstate railway lines.
112
  Justice Charles Evans Hughs wrote that congressional 
power in these circumstances ―necessarily embraces the right to control... operations in all 
matters having a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate 
service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be 
conducted upon fair terms.‖113  The power to regulate wholly intrastate railway shipments that 
have ―a close and substantial relation‖ to interstate commerce is a Bedford Resolution type 
power accomplished under the guise of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Between 1895 and 
1937, the Supreme Court did strike down acts of Congress to enforce categorical constitutional 
federalism in a series of cases that Professor Bermann declines to mention, presumably because 
most of them are no longer good law.  In those cases the Court distinguished between commerce, 
which Congress could regulate, and manufacturing or agriculture, which it could not.  Among 
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these cases are:  United States v. E.C. Knight Co.;
114
 Hammer v. Dagenhart;
115
 Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co.;
116
 Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States;
117
 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.;
118
 and 
United States v. Butler.
119
  Though these cases are all now overruled (except for Bailey), they 
importantly foreshadow the reemergence of judicially enforced constitutional federalism in the 
1995 United States v. Lopez decision discussed below. 
 During the New Deal Constitutional Revolution of 1937, the Supreme Court decisively 
rejected categorical federalism for all time, holding that all wholly intrastate commerce that 
substantially affects commerce among the States is regulable under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  The Court held in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. that 
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, popularly known as the Wagner Act, was 
constitutional.
120
  The Wagner Act effectively governed labor law in manufacturing entities that 
shipped goods nationwide.  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes found the same ―close and 
substantial‖ connection between a wholly intrastate activity and interstate commerce that he had 
found as an associate justice in The Shreveport Rate Cases.  Jones & Laughlin Steel says that 
labor peace is so important to commerce among the several States that Congress can regulate it 
as a means (under the Necessary and Proper Clause) toward promoting interstate commerce.  
Jones & Laughlin Steel, together with McCulloch, Knox v. Lee, Fong Yue Ting, and the 
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Shreveport Rate Cases, made it clear beyond any doubt that the federal government has power 
under Article I, Section 8 to solve all collective action and Economics of Federalism problems.
121
   
 In conclusion, U.S. Constitutional Law has been infused with subsidiarity considerations 
from the outset, as the Bedford Resolution history indicates.  Further, in a series of landmark 
Supreme Court opinions from the Founding Era up until 1995, the Supreme Court has held that 
the national government may regulate all wholly intrastate activities that substantially affect 
commerce or any other federal power.  This is a test that is on its face indeterminate and which 
invites consideration of the Economics of Federalism as a way to supply needed content.  We 
turn now to four areas where the U.S. Supreme Court currently enforces constitutional 
federalism that might benefit from an Economics of Federalism analysis. 
C. Supreme Court Caselaw and Subsidiarity 
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 The New Deal Supreme Court codified the new understanding in United States v. 
Darby, in 1941 and in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  Wickard held that in 
determining whether Congress had power to regulate the growing of wheat for one‘s own 
consumption, the Supreme Court ought not to look only at the wheat grown by one particular 
farmer-litigant but it should look in the aggregate at all the wheat grown for such purposes 
nationwide.  During the Great Society years of the 1960‘s, the Supreme Court expanded Darby 
and Wickard by holding in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) that in applying the 
Wickard aggregation test to wholly intrastate activities that affect substantially commerce, the 
Supreme Court ought to defer to Congress if it had some rational basis for thinking, after 
aggregation, that a wholly intrastate activity substantially affected commerce among the States.  
The combination of the Wickard aggregation test, together with the Katzenbach v. McClung, 
rational basis test meant that anything Congress wanted to do under the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses was now potentially within Congress‘s reach.  These two 
opinions, in our view, run counter not only to categorical federalism but also to the economics of 
federalism by giving Congress the power to legislate without any constitutional constraint.  As 
we explained above, we do not think the benefits of the economics of federalism are likely to be 




The four areas of current Supreme Court caselaw that enforce subsidiarity include:  1) 
Congress‘s Enumerated Lawmaking Powers, 2) the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3) 
Intergovernmental Immunities and Preemption, and 4) federal jurisdiction caselaw.  In each area, 
fleshing out the subsidiarity idea with an open consideration of the Economics of Federalism 
could help to clarify the law.
122
 
1.  Congress’s Enumerated Lawmaking Powers 
In its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez the U.S. Supreme Court held by a vote of 5 to 4 
that Congress lacked power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses to 
criminalize bringing a gun within 1,000 feet of a school.
123
  The Court distinguished all the cases 
previously discussed, noting they all involved commercial activities whereas Lopez involved a 
garden variety state law crime.  Further, over forty States criminalized bringing guns to school, 
which meant there was no race to the bottom over the issue.  It was also clear from the facts of 
the case that federal regulation would realize no economies of scale, there were no negative 
external effects of state law to correct, and there were no civil rights issues lurking in the case.  
The outcome in United States v. Lopez was thus entirely consistent with the Economics of 
Federalism.
124
  Lopez reiterated the doctrine of Jones & Laughlin Steel that Congress could only 
regulate wholly intrastate activities that substantially burdened interstate commerce, but this time 
it struck down a federal statute instead of upholding it.   
                                                          
122
 See also Mills, supra note __ arguing that the U.S. could improve its conflict of laws rules if it 
would follow the EU‘s subsidiarity optimizing approach. 
123
 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
124
  Nonetheless, the justices explained their holding by trying to draw a categorical distinction 
between commercial activities which were federally regulable and noncommercial activities that 
were not.  This distinction was to prove to be very difficult to sustain in the post-Lopez caselaw.   
42 
 
Since Lopez, the Supreme Court has applied the Substantial Effects Test twice – and reached 
the wrong result both times in our view.  In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court 
wrongly struck down a civil rights measure, the Violence Against Women Act,
125
 while in 
Gonzales v. Raich, the Court wrongly upheld a federal statute that criminally punished a woman 
who grew six marijuana plants in her house – which was legal under California state law.126   
The Court‘s holding in Morrison was consistent with a categorical approach but inconsistent 
with the Economics of Federalism.  The law at issue in Morrison was a civil rights law, and, as 
we argued above, the federal government ought to have the power to adopt such measures.
127
  
The Court‘s holding in Gonzales v. Raich was problematic because states differed in their tastes, 
preferences, and conditions on the medical use of marijuana, and because the federal interest in 
regulating possession of very small amounts of home grown marijuana by very ill people was 
quite small.  We agree with the dissenters in both Morrison and Raich for Economics of 
Federalism reasons.   
Thus, with these three cases since 1995, the Supreme Court is back in the business of 
policing Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.  The justices‘ vigorous oral arguments in March 
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2012 over the constitutionality of President Barack Obama‘s newly enacted national health care 
mandate especially illuminated this revival.
128
   
Three other post-Lopez cases enforcing the limits of federal enumerated powers also deserve 
mention.  First, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.
129
  This Act purported to protect religious freedom more expansively 
than the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of Section 1 of the 14th amendment, but the Court did 
not agree that Congress‘s Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting 
―appropriate‖ laws authorized the Act.  City of Boerne v. Flores announced a new test of 
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 The most recent enumerated power/federalism/subsidiarity issue to confront the U.S. 
Supreme Court involves the constitutional challenges to President Obama‘s National Health Care 
law – a law that was passed by Congress on March 21, 2010.128  This law requires requires that 
individuals who lack health insurance to either buy it or pay a tax penalty for their failure to do 
so.  The Health Care Mandate that requires individuals who lack health insurance to buy it is 
defended as being a necessary and proper means of carrying into execution Congress‘s 
commerce power to regulate the national, commercial health insurance industry.  The proponents 
of the law argue that the States cannot themselves regulate healthcare because doing so would set 
off a race-to-the-bottom, collective action problem.  This argument seems dubious since only one 
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Is the health care mandate congruent and proportionate?  We think the answer is no for two 
reasons.  First, in 220 years of American constitutional history Congress has never previously 
imposed a mandate that compelled people to buy something they did not want to buy.  
Obviously, there is a first time for everything, but the fact this has never, ever been done before 
is certainly enough to raise suspicion.  And, second, if Congress can henceforth mandate the 
buying of things  -- if it can compel people to enter into commerce as well as regulating 
commerce that is already ongoing – there will open up a vast prospect of new rent seeking 
legislation by the special interests to which the government in Washington, DC is already 
enthralled.  GM and Chrysler will seek mandates forcing people to buy their cars, dairy farmers 
will seek mandate forcing people to buy milk, and chiropractors and acupuncturists will seek 
legislation to force consumers to buy their services. 
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―congruence and proportionality‖ to determine whether laws were ―appropriate‖ measures to 
enforce Section 1 of the 14
th
 amendment.  The Supreme Court went on to invalidate federal laws 
in three subsequent cases: 1) Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. 
College Savings Bank;
130
 2) Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents;
131
 and 3) Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett.
132
  Eventually, the Supreme Court paused in its vigorous 
application of the ―congruence and proportionality‖ test, and upheld the two of Congress‘s 
acts.
133
  Nonethless, by invalidating federal laws in City of Boerne; Florida Prepaid; Kimel; and 
Garrett, as well as Lopez and Morrison, the Court starkly reminded Congress that it was very 
definitely back in the business of policing and enforcing the enumeration of federal powers. 
Second, in Printz v. United States
134
 the Court held 5 to 4 that Congress could not 
commandeer states into helping to execute federal laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
This important opinion built on the Court‘s prior holding in New York v. United States135 that 
Congress could not conscript state legislatures.  In 2010, the Supreme Court decided another 
Necessary and Proper Clause case, United States v. Comstock, addressing whether Congress had 
power to authorize committing a mentally ill and sexually dangerous prisoner to federal custody 
beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be detained.
136
  The Court allowed that federal 
power in this case, but the very narrow and closely reasoned decision suggested the justices took 
the issue seriously.  Justice Breyer‘s opinion for the Court upheld Congress‘s claimed power 
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only because of five very specific concerns.  Justice Thomas‘s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, 
complained that the federal prisoner civil commitment statute was not necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution some other federal enumerated power.  Justices Alito and Kennedy voted 
with the majority and wrote the federal law carried into execution the same enumerated power 
that had supported the prisoner‘s original conviction. 
Third, in two sovereign immunity cases – Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida137 and Alden 
v. Maine
138
 -- the Supreme Court held that an Act of Congress purporting to give state employees 
a right to sue state governments for money damages in federal and state court was an 
unconstitutional exercise of federal enumerated powers.  These two decisions thus strongly 
support the proposition that there has been a strong federalist revival in U.S. constitutional law in 
recent years.   
In summary, since the 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez the Supreme Court has 
vigorously enforced federalism limits on congressional legislative power.  It stuck down two 
federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds and four statutes on the grounds they were not 
―appropriate‖ laws for the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
decided two big Necessary and Proper Clause cases during this period, Printz v. United States 
and United States v. Comstock, in which it upheld a federal law only because five separate 
considerations taken together suggested that the law was necessary and proper.  Finally, the court 
held federal laws allowing individuals to sue state governments for money damages in federal or 
state court were unconstitutional.  The message from the Supreme Court is loud and clear: it is 
policing the enumeration of federal powers in a serious way. 
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The Supreme Court has not, however, articulated a very useful test to evaluate whether a 
federal law is unconstitutional.  It continues to use Chief Justice Hugh‘s test from Jones & 
Laughlin Steel that Congress can only regulate wholly intrastate activities if they substantially 
affect interstate commerce.  But what does the word ―substantially‖ really mean?  How do we 
know which wholly intrastate activities ―substantially‖ affect interstate commerce and which do 
not?  The Supreme Court simply never says. 
The Court has no better test for enforcing Section 5 of the 14
th
 amendment, which gives 
Congress power to pass ―appropriate‖ legislation.  Since City of Boerne v. Flores the Court has 
asked whether Section 5 legislation is a ―congruent and proportional‖ measure to secure Section 
1 Fourteenth Amendment rights.  But what does ―congruence and proportionality‖ mean?  In 
Tennesse v. Lane,
139
 Justice Scalia announced that he would no longer follow the ―congruence 
and proportionality‖ test because it was too indeterminate.140  Instead, he would uphold any 
rational Section 5 legislation targeted at race discrimination, and he would strike down anything 
else.  Justice Scalia‘s approach is inadequate and, moreover, it is even less faithful to the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment than is the congruence and proportionality test.
141
 
                                                          
139
   541 U.S. 509 (2004) 
140
   Id. at [get cite] 
141  Professor Calabresi‘s views on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment are set out in:  
Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Stabile,  On Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1431 (2009); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Julia Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, forthcoming with the Texas Law Review 
(2011); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart 106 Michigan 
Law Review 1517 (2008); and Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo. Individual Rights Under 
State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are 




We think the ―substantially affecting‖ test under the Commerce Clause and the ―congruence 
and proportionality‖ test under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are inherently 
indeterminate.  The Economics of Federalism approach would better resolve whether an act 
inherently falls within the sphere of national power or state power.   The Economics of 
Federalism reveals the Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez was unnecessary grandstanding; the 
States had no race to the bottom or other problem to correct.  The statute in United States v. 
Morrison, on the other hand, might have been a valid federal civil rights measure.  Finally, the 
Controlled Substances Act, as applied in Gonzales v. Raich, and the federal statute in Wickard, 
hardly met the ―substantial‖ effects test because homegrown marijuana or wheat has at most an 
indirect effect on national markets.  Also, California is among sixteen States that have legalized 
medical marijuana in recent years.  Given that nearly one-third of the fifty States have spoken on 
the issue it is apparent that tastes and cultural preferences vary sharply across the United States.  
It is thus a classic Economics of Federalism issue which ought to be left at the state level to 
accommodate many viewpoints and to permit this experiment with the medical marijuana to 
proceed. 
We have no idea what the future will hold for the Supreme Court‘s enforcement of federal 
constitutionally enumerated powers.   We think the post-1995 Supreme Court caselaw 
conclusively indicates that constitutional federalism and subsidiarity are alive and well in 
present-day American constitutional law.  Students of U.S. constitutional law ought to study the 
Economics of Federalism and subsidiarity to analyze enumerated powers and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.
142
   Both concepts are essential to understanding American federalism from 
the days of the Bedford Resolution, at the Philadelphia Convention, on up to United States v. 
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Lopez‘s holding that federal power extends only to those ―intrastate activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.‖  Both answer what ―substantial‖ effects and ―necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution‖ the enumerated powers really mean. 
2.  Dormant Commerce Clause 
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court says the 
Constitution implicitly preempts state laws that burden interstate commerce in certain prohibited 
ways.  The doctrine was born in Gibbons v. Ogden,
143
 percolated in Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek 
Marsh Co.
144
 and first flourished in a recognizable holding in Cooley v. Board of Wardens
145
-- 
where the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law that required that all ships entering or 
leaving the port of Philadelphia have a local pilot.   
Cooley, decided in 1851, says that sometimes the Commerce Power was an exclusively 
national power that preempted conflicting state laws, but at other times it was merely a 
concurrent national power that did not constitutionally preempt state laws.  Justice Curtis‘s 
opinion for the Court explained that: 
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of [the commerce] power requires 
exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this 
power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part.  
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform 
system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require 
exclusive legislation by Congress.   That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the 
regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain.
146
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The Court thus essentially upheld the Pennsylvania law requiring local pilots based on an 
Economics of Federalism intuition.  Justice Curtis thought the law was a bona fide local health 
and safety measure and not economic protectionism which unreasonably burdened interstate 
commerce. 
 Since Cooley, the Supreme Court has enforced the Dormant Commerce Clause with some 
regularity.  And since the New Deal, the Court has almost exclusively used the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to prevent state economic protectionism.  Professor Donald H. Regan 
explained in an important law review article, ―Not only is this what the Court has been doing, it 
is just what the Court should do.  This and no more.‖147  In Pike v. Bruce Church,148a landmark 
1970 Dormant Commerce Clause case, the Supreme Court said: 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.  
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.  
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will, of course, depend on the 
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities.
149
 
Pike v. Bruce Church thus announced a two-part test for identifying whether state laws fall afoul 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  State laws are invalid if either (1) they discriminate on their 
face against interstate commerce, or (2) the burden on interstate commerce outweighs any state 
or local benefit.  Professor Regan explains Pike v. Bruce Church and its progeny as cases that 
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prevent the states from engaging in economic protectionism with tariffs and embargoes, for 
example. 
 The Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw asks Court to distinguish between state laws 
that only reflect varying state preferences and conditions and those which also burden interstate 
commerce.  The Court must police a line between laws that mainly affect one state and ones that 
affect national interests and are thus preempted.  In practice, state laws with significant negative 
external affects on other states are struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause.  In Pike v. 
Bruce Church itself, the Court invalidated an Arizona law that required that Arizona cantaloupes 
be packed in Arizona and be labeled as Arizona-grown rather than being packed across the 
border in California.  The Supreme Court easily decided that whatever state interest this law 
served was outweighed by its protectionist effect on interstate commerce. 
 The Supreme Court has decided several Dormant Commerce Clause cases since the New 
Deal, and all of them address the economic line between matters that affect mainly one state and 
matters that are protectionist and affect interstate commerce.  The Court thus applies the 
Economics of Federalism and, in effect subsidiarity, in its Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw.  
Therefore, subsidiarity cannot be a stranger to U.S. constitutional law.  Subsidiarity concerns are 
quite evident in in the Dormant Commerce Clause context and the Supreme Court routinely 
enforces them. 
3.  Intergovernmental Immunities and Preemption  
The Supreme Court has long held that the different levels of American government cannot 
single out each others‘ officers and instrumentalities for discriminatory treatment.  This principle 
51 
 
is evident in McCulloch v. Maryland.
150
   In McCulloch, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Maryland state tax on a Maryland branch of the federally chartered Bank of the United States.  A 
critical fact in the Court‘s analysis was that state only taxed the Bank of the United States and 
not all other Maryland banks.  The Supreme Court held that Maryland could equally tax all 
banks doing business in the state, but that it could not single out the federal bank.  In the Court‘s 
view, the Constitution preempted such action even without a preempting act of Congress. 
John Hart Ely praises McCulloch in Democracy and Distrust, writing that if majorities in 
one state could tax all U.S. citizens on federal instrumentalities there would be an obvious failure 
in the political process.
151
  This explains why we allow states to tax federal employees‘ income, 
but at the same rates private employees pay.  Similarly, the federal government may tax state 
employees‘ income at the same rates private employees pay.  Neither level of government can 
constitutionally single out the officers or instrumentalities of another level of government for 
unusual treatment. 
This insight underlies the Supreme Court‘s New Federal Common Law doctrine, first 
announced in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.
152
  That case held that federal negotiable 
instruments issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia were governed by a federal 
common law rule, rather than by state common law under Erie Railroad Co, v. Tompkins.
153
  The 
court‘s conclusion rested on the important Economics of Federalism interest the uniformity 
context.  The Court reached a similar conclusion in 1988 in Boyle v. United Technologies 
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 which held that a federal common law rule protected military contractors from state tort 
suits for damages caused by their design specifications.   The Court held the Constitution 
preempted such state tort suits because of the national government‘s Economics of Federalism 
interest in designing military equipment free from state tort juries‘ second-guessing.  The 
Supreme Court‘s New Federal Common Law doctrine thus represents another area of caselaw 
that addresses subsidiarity concerns. 
Finally, in New York v. United States
155
 and Printz v. United States
156
 the Supreme Court 
held that Congress could neither commandeer state legislatures or executive officials to pass 
certain laws nor impose unfunded mandates on state law enforcement officers.  Economics of 
Federalism concerns animate both of these cases because state officers should set policies that 
reflect state majorities‘ differing tastes, conditions, and preferences.  The Court expresses 
concern that lines of voter accountability will be blurred and the benefits of federalism lost if 
Congress can force state legislatures and executives to do its bidding using state resources and 
personnel.  New York v. United States and Printz reflect the concern in McCulloch and in the 
Dormant Commerce Clause cases that one level of government ought not to be able to burden or 
discriminate against the other in American constitutional federalism.  The intergovernmental 
immunities cases all involve the Constitution preempting state laws that burden national interests 
or institutions, but often very important cases also arise as to whether federal statutes preempt 
state law.  Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, federal law preempts state law, including 
state constitutional law, when federal and state law conflict.
157
  It is Congress‘s intent thatthta 
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controls in statutory preemption cases, and Congress may indicate its preemptive intent either 
expressly or through the structure and purpose of the statute enacted.  Statutes may impliedly 
preempt state law where:  1) federal law is in conflict with state law or 2) where Congress‘s 
regulatory structure is so comprehensive that it occupies the whole field in that area of law. 
The Supreme Court‘s statutory preemption cases turn on the language and history of each 
federal statute and on the facts of each case.  Critics find it at best to be a muddle and at worst to 
be an invitation to judges to fall back on their own policy views in federal statutory preemption 
cases.  One judge, Judge Stephen F. Williams, has openly called on federal judges to apply the 
Economics of Federalism in these decisions.
158
  We agree with Judge Williams that this would 
improve the federal statutory preemption caselaw. 
Federal statutory preemption is yet another context where federal judges weigh whether a 
state law intrudes on a federal interest or concerns only a state matter as to which tastes, 
preferences, and conditions may legitimately vary.  It is simply inevitable that the federal courts 
will have to consult the Economics of Federalism and thus subsidiarity in these cases.  
Subsidiarity may not be mentioned in the text of the Constitution, but the document is of 
necessity infused with subsidiarity concerns. 
4.   Federal Jurisdiction 
Federal jurisdiction is the final area of caselaw where subsidiarity concerns are clearly 
present.  Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. of Harvard Law School argues that federal jurisdiction 
approaches have tended to display either a federalist sympathy for state power or a nationalist 
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sympathy for federal court power.
159
  Professor Martin H. Redish has made much the same point 
in an important book in the field.
160
  There are several doctrines in the field of federal jurisdiction 
that proponents of state autonomy have used to guarantee that federal power should only be used 
where it is a vital subsidium or form of aid for the federal courts. 
The law of federal jurisdiction protects the autonomy, and some would even say the primacy, 
of state over federal courts.  This is due to the Anti-Injunction Act, which limits federal court 
injunctions of state judicial proceedings,
161
 to the various abstention doctrines, which require 
federal courts to often abstain from acting until proceedings have finished in the state courts
162
 
and to federal protection of state sovereign immunity.
163
  Recent Supreme Court cases have also 
cut back on federal habeas corpus review, which review remains nonetheless as a significant 
limit on congressional power.
164
  The state courts also share concurrent jurisdiction with the 
federal courts over at least some federal question and diversity cases.
165
   
Federalism subsidiarity concerns took center stage in 1938 when the New Deal Supreme 
Court abandoned Swift v. Tyson‘s166 so-called general federal common law in Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins‘167 landmark holding.  The New Deal Court valued federalism in this area of law 
because it promoted experimentation and competition, which are core subsidiarity concerns.  
Given that the New Dealers abandoned enumerated powers federalism, it is striking that the 
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Supreme Court in that era championed federalism in most federal common law contexts 
(excepting the Clearfield Trust line of cases mentioned above).   
The Erie doctrine is motivated by subsidiarity concerns, though Michael Greve has criticized 
it for leading to ―upside-down federalism‖ because it enhances state efforts at maintaining 
cartels.  We are quite sympathetic, as a policy matter, with Greve‘s criticisms of Erie, but there is 
no doubt as an historical matter that the opinion reflects in part Justice Brandeis‘s devotion to 
subsidiarity.  Brandeis authored the Erie opinion and the dissent in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, which lauded the states as laboratories of experimentation.  Erie is additional 
evidence of how intricately the law of federal jurisdiction is intertwined with subsidiarity 
concerns. 
 In summary, the law of federal jurisdiction supports our thesis that subsidiarity concerns 
have long animated the U.S. Supreme Court even without the label ―subsidiarity.‖  We think that 
a better understanding of subsidiarity and the Economics of Federalism would thus be of great 
value to the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding federal jurisdiction cases. 
*         *         *         *         *         *         *         * 
We think judicial enforcement of constitutional federalism is a good idea; that the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution infused that document with the idea of subsidiarity; and that 
the U.S. Supreme Court‘s caselaw involving Congress‘s Enumerated Lawmaking Powers, 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, intergovernmental immunities, preemption, and federal 
jurisdiction suggests that there is judicial enforcement of subsidiarity in present day U.S. 
constitutional law.  We do not claim that the current U.S. caselaw generates all the gains that 
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judicial enforcement of subsidiarity ideally would realize, but we do believe it achieves many 
such gains.  In any event, current doctrine could be improved if its relationship to the 
Economics of Federalism and subsidiarity were more widely understood. 
 
 III.  Incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the Margin of Appreciation 
The economics of federalism and subsidiarity are relevant as well to a second big problem in 
American constitutional law:  the debate over whether and to what degree the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights and applies it against the States.
168
   This question 
recently took center stage in McDonald v. City of Chicago, where the Supreme Court held that 
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment which applied that right against the States.
169
  This issue ended up splitting the 
Supreme Court 5 to 4 and even the five justices in the majority were unable to agree among 
themselves on a rationale. 
We consider here what relevance the economics of federalism has for the question of when to 
guarantee human rights across the whole continental United States plus Hawaii and when the 
Supreme Court ought to leave a matter for decision by the States.
170
  We begin in Section A 
below by discussing the applicability of the economics of federalism to the problem of whether 
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to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the States.  We then turn in Section B to a discussion of 
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as it bears on the incorporation problem.  
Section C considers the three main approaches taken in practice by Supreme Court justices to the 
incorporation issue between 1897 and 2010.  Section D discusses the approach we think the 
Supreme Court ought to follow to incorporation cases.  And, Section E then analyzes the 
opinions in McDonald v. City of Chicago in light of our interpretive theory. 
A.  Subsidiarity and Incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
While the Bill of Rights applies only to actions by the federal government, the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to state and local governments.  The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 
1868, but the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Amendment so that the Bill of Rights 
would apply against the States did not begin until 1897 in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago
171
 and even today several provisions of the Bill of Rights have 
not been incorporated.  Thus, today, the Third Amendment guarantee against the quartering of 
soldiers in private homes, the Fifth Amendment guarantee of indictment only by a grand jury, 
and the Seventh Amendment right of civil jury trial have not been incorporated.  Moreover, 
while the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial has been incorporated it means a lot less at the 
state level than it does at the federal level.  The States are allowed to have criminal juries of only 
six persons while a common law jury of twelve persons is required at the federal level.  What, 
then, are the economic and susidiarity-based arguments against and in favor of the recognition of 
a new, national individual constitutional right? 
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The first argument against the recognition of new national or transnational individual rights 
is that tastes, cultural preferences, and real world conditions may vary from one state to another.  
Thus, the residents of large, scarcely populated western States where there is a lot of hunting 
may have a different preference with regard to gun rights than is held by smaller, more densely 
populated northeastern States.  The Supreme Court may be well advised to avoid recognizing 
new national laws until they are supported by an overwhelming proportion of the population.  
This concern counsels not only against incorporation of parts of the Bill of Rights, but also 
against the creation of new national, substantive due process rights such as a right to an abortion 
or to gay marriage.
172
 
The second and third arguments against the creation or recognition of new national 
individual rights are that in the absence of such rights the States will compete with one another 
and experiment in order to obtain an optimal and popular Bill of Rights climate.  State 
competition and experimentation with gay rights, including gay marriage, has been a relatively 
peaceful and harmonious process in part because the Supreme Court has only acted to protect 
gay rights after national public opinion had shifted in their favor.  The Supreme Court did not act 
as an agent of social change in its decisions in Romer v. Evans,
173
 where it invalidated one highly 
idiosyncratic state law, or in Lawrence v. Texas,
174
 where it invalidated thirteen state sodomy 
laws that were never enforced after thirty-seven other States had already repealed their sodomy 
laws.  In contrast, the Supreme Court did act as an agent of national social change and it did 
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stifle competition and experimentation with its sweeping abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade.
175
  The 
public controversy and ill will engendered by Roe can be usefully contrasted with the 
comparative harmony on gay rights issues. 
The fourth and final argument against the creation or recognition of new national, individual 
rights by the U.S. Supreme Court is the higher cost of monitoring a national life tenured 
institution as compared with the much lower cost of monitoring state Supreme Courts the justices 
of which are often term-limited or are even subject to election.  There is no question but that it is 
very hard and expensive for state voters to monitor and rein in the U.S. Supreme Court when it 
makes a mistake. 
On the flip side, however, there are also powerful economic arguments in favor of 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights or in favor of substantive due process, national rights creation.  
First, the fifty United States are so territorially small and numerous that they may be unable 
collectively to guarantee individual rights.  Consider the First Amendment protection of freedom 
of speech and of the press.  Much of what we say or publish today gets disseminated in a national 
market.  If our rights of freedom of speech or of the press existed only at the state level, we 
might be liable to prosecution in some States where our remarks would broadcast or published.  
There are economies of scale to protecting First Amendment rights nationally, and the cost to the 
States of protecting such rights collectively might be prohibitively high. 
Second, state laws that experiment too boldly or that stray too far from the national 
consensus may impose a huge negative external cost on other States.  In the late Nineteenth 
Century, Congress and the Supreme Court reached a consensus opinion that States like Utah or 
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Idaho ought not to be allowed to have legal polygamy.  This view was epitomized in the 
Supreme Court‘s unanimous 1879 decision in Reynolds v. United States.176  Essentially, the 
national majority concluded that polygamy was too disruptive a social experiment for it to be 
allowed to go forward.  Just as States are not allowed to experiment with aristocratic or 
theocratic Constitutions under the Guarantee Clause so too could the States not be allowed to 
experiment with polygamy.  One can argue with the judgment call in Reynolds itself, but the 
principle is undoubtedly a correct one.  It is for this reason that we no longer allow States to 
experiment with laws that discriminate on the basis of race. 
Third, the civil rights rationale for national power in the theory of the economics of 
federalism suggests that some core civil rights guarantees such as protection from discrimination 
based on race or religion or sex ought to be nationally guaranteed.  National governments in fact 
do a better job of protecting civil rights than do state and local governments.  For the same 
reason, national Supreme Courts may do a better job of protecting civil rights than state Supreme 
Courts will do.  There is value in having a geographically distant, life tenured tribunal reviewing 
the decisions of entrenched majorities in state capitals.  Geographic distance can lead to 
impartiality and fairness. 
In summary, the economics of federalism tends to support some degree of variation in 
national, individual rights from state to state, but no variation as to fundamental, civil rights 
especially rights of political participation and rights against discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, or sex.  Indeed, laws that limit rights of political participation, or that discriminate, may 
actually close down the political processes of change that John Hart Ely described in Democracy 
                                                          
176





  If that happens federalism may cease to work effectively because an entrenched 
state majority may just shut out and completely tyrannize a minority.  This is, of course, 
precisely what happened with the Jim Crow laws in the south prior to 1964. 
The economics of federalism suggests powerful reasons overall for protecting the rights of 
political participation that John Hart Ely wrote about such as the rights of freedom of speech and 
of the press, freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom from racial and sex 
discrimination, and the right to one person, one vote.  The economics of federalism do not, 
however, necessarily suggest that we ought to have national codes and rights of criminal or civil 
procedure, unless those rights are needed for the protecting of a racial or other minority‘s civil 
rights.  Competition and experimentation among the States as to criminal procedural or civil 
procedure rights might well be better than a one size fits all, fifty state approach.  The economics 
of federalism points us toward some kind of selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights of the 
kind favored by Justices Felix Frankfurter and the younger Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
although without the substantive due process that both those justices favored.  Substantive due 
process often leads to major federalism problems as happened with Roe v. Wade and before Roe 
with Lochner v. New York.
178
 
 B.  Original Meaning and Incorporation 
Selective or partial incorporation with no substantive due process may be optimal as a policy 
matter, but is it consistent with the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?  A 
full exposition of our views on the original and present day meaning of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment is set out in the sources cited in the footnote at the start of this section of our 
article.
179
  Suffice it to say here that not everything that is wise is constitutionally mandated and 
not everything that is unwise is constitutionally prescribed. 
Analysis of whether the Fourteenth Amendment and the incorporation question must begin 
with its text.  Section 1 of the amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
180
 
Scholars agree that the rights conferring clause in the language quoted above was meant to be the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause which protected all common law rights, rights in state Bills of 
Rights, and possibly rights in the national Bill of Rights from ―abridgement.‖  The Due Process 
Clause in 1868 was almost certainly understood as a guarantee only of procedural regularity as 
against arbitrary executive branch and judicial action.  The Equal Protection Clause was 
understood originally as guaranteeing each citizen a right to equal ―protection‖ of those laws 
against murder and violence and theft that were already on the books.  The Equal Protection 
Clause thus protected against non-enforcement of a State‘s murder laws when there had been a 
lynching.  The Clause was about the equal protection of those laws that were already on the 
books and not about protection from discrimination in the making of laws.
181
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The only Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that addresses equality and the making of 
laws is the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  This Clause explicitly says ―No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.‖  How does this Clause ban race discrimination?  It says no state can give an abridged or 
shortened set of rights to one class of citizens, like African Americans, as compared to another 
class of citizens, like whites.  Abridgments can be targeted at a class of citizens, which is why 
the Fifteenth Amendment says:  ―The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.‖182 
But abridgments need not be targeted at a class of people to qualify as abridgements.  Some 
abridgments burden only an individual and his individual rights.  This is evident in the First 
Amendment which bans ―abridgments‖ of individual rights.  The text of the First Amendment 
provides that:  ―Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.‖183  The Privileges or Immunities Clause then protected both against discrimination and 
against depriving an individual of his rights. 
What rights did the Privileges or Immunities Clause protect?  What were the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States?  First, we know that everyone born in the United 
States is by operation of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment a citizen both of the 
United States and of the state wherein he resides.  It follows a fortiori that the privileges or 
immunities of a citizen of the United States include not only his privileges or immunities as a 
citizen of the nation but also his privileges or immunities as a citizen of the state wherein he 
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resides.  This has to be true because we know the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect 
the right of African Americans to exercise the same common law rights of contract, property 
ownership, and torts etc … as state law allowed white citizens to exercise.  The privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States thus included not only their common law rights but 
also their rights under state Bills of Rights.
184
 
The general consensus on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that 
it protected as privileges or immunities those privileges and immunities that Article IV, Section 2 
guarantees to out-of-staters when they are in another State.  The content of those privileges and 
immunities is described in a rambling opinion by Justice Bushrod Washington (George‘s 
nephew) that all the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment seemed to regard as talismanic.  
Justice Washington said the following in Corfield v. Coryell about what were and were not 
privileges or immunities: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states?  We feel no hesitation in confining these 
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their 
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by 
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from 
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What 
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious 
than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all 
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by 
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and 
obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints 
as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to 
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
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professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ 
of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in 
the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either 
real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or 
impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be 
mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of 
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of 
privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the 
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or 
constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and 
many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, 
privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the 
citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly 
calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the 
corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) ―the 
better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different states of the Union.‖185 
The bottom line under Corfield v. Coryell is that all common law rights and state constitutional 
rights that were deeply rooted in history and tradition were protected as privileges or immunities 
but that those rights could be trumped by a States police power to promote the common good.  
Note the passage underlined above which says that all rights are:  ―subject nevertheless to such 
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.‖  Under 
Corfield v. Coryell, there is a right to liberty of contract and probably also a right to bodily 
integrity but it is subject to reasonable police power regulation that promotes the common good.  
Corfield grants a huge number of rights with one hand, but it makes all those rights subject to 
police power negation so long as the state government is acting ―justly‖ to promote ―the general 
good of the whole.‖ 
 What does this indicate about the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment was 
originally meant to apply the federal Bill of Rights to the States or to offer federal constitutional 
protection to items in state Bills of Rights?  It suggests the Framers of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment did mean to protect a broad array of individual rights but all of those rights could be 
trumped by a state government that was acting ―justly‖ and that was trying to secure ―the general 
good of the whole [people].‖  So read, the Fourteenth Amendment is little more than a protection 
against special interest or class based laws.  It offers little protection for individual rights. 
C.  Incorporation and Practice from 1868 to 2010 
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never gave us any clear guidance on their vision 
of a Privileges or Immunities Clause that protected everything but did not protect it very much.  
And, in any event, the Supreme Court almost immediately read the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to be a nullity in The Slaughter-House Cases.
186
  As a result, the individual rights 
protecting function of the Privileges or Immunities Clause came to be performed by the doctrine 
of substantive due process and the anti-discrimination function of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause came to be performed by the Equal Protection Clause.  Incorporation of the federal Bill of 
Rights against the States began in 1897 as a matter of protecting fundamental rights through 
substantive due process, and, in the recent McDonald v. City of Chicago incorporation case, 
substantive due process remained the textual underpinning of the incorporation doctrine.  In 
practice, the justices of the Supreme Court have weighed three different theories of incorporation 
between 1897 and 2010.  All of these theories are open to criticism in light of the history 
recounted above. 
The first clearly articulated theory of incorporation was Justice Felix Frankfurter‘s idea that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected only fundamental rights – a category that was both larger 
than and smaller than the Bill of Rights.  Frankfurter articulated his theory in Adamson v. 
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California where he made it clear that freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religion, 
and protection of private property from takings were all secured by the Fourteenth Amendment 
but that the amendment did NOT protect the criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights.
187
  Frankfurter‘s approach made sense as a policy matter since all western democracies 
recognize and protect the rights he labeled as fundamental while many Civil Law nations do not 
recognize a right to jury trial or to protection from self incrimination or double jeopardy. 
The problem with Justice Frankfurter‘s position, as Justice Hugo Black frequently pointed 
out, was that in the Anglo-American constitutional tradition as it stood in 1868 the criminal 
procedure rights that Justice Frankfurter disparaged were all clearly recognized as being 
fundamental rights.  More than three quarters of the state Bills of Rights in 1868 protected the 
rights to criminal and civil jury trial and to freedom against self-incrimination or double 
jeopardy.  Justice Frankfurter‘s position was thus exposed as being in tension with Anglo-
American constitutional history. 
The second clearly articulated theory of incorporation was Justice Hugo Black‘s idea, set 
forth in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California.
188
  Justice Black thought the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the rights in the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights and 
nothing more and nothing less.  Justice Black eschewed substantive due process, and he called 
for lashing Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the first eight amendments in the federal 
Bill of Rights.  Justice Black may well have been right that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
                                                          
187
 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
188
 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black‘s views are for the most part 
defended in Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights:  Creation and Reconstruction (2000). 
68 
 
originally meant to apply the federal Bill of Rights against the States but there are multiple 
weaknesses in his argument. 
First, if Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to incorporate the federal Bill of 
Rights and only the federal Bill of Rights against the States, why does it talk open-endedly about 
protecting the privileges or immunities of national and state citizenship?  Surely, the Privileges 
or Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are a strange way of 
incorporating the rights in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution.  This is 
especially the case since the first eight amendments include the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Why would it be necessary to include a Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment if that amendment had been meant to incorporate the federal Bill of Rights? 
Second, under Justice Black‘s reading, Section1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
protect such state common law rights as liberty of contract, the right to own property, family law, 
the right to sue in torts etc …  If so, then Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment fails in its goal 
to outlaw race discrimination by the States as to common law rights.  It is implausible to read 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that causes it to fail to accomplish the central 
goal of its drafters.
189
 
Third, Justice Black is wrong in so far as he argues that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect at least some common law liberty rights such as freedom to pursue 
one‘s livelihood or occupation.  A brief glance back at the passage we quoted from Corfield v. 
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Coryell above makes it clear that Section 1 was meant to apply to economic rights that go well 
beyond anything to be found in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. 
Ultimately, the deficiencies of Justices Black‘s and Frankfurter‘s opinions in Adamson led to 
a third theory of selective incorporation – a theory that was put forward and championed by 
former Justice William J. Brennan.  Justice Brennan argued that Justice Black was right that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the criminal procedure rights in the first eight amendments 
to the federal Constitution while Justice Frankfurter and the younger Justice Harlan were right 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected such unenumerated rights as the right to privacy that 
was elaborated in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.  Justice Brennan‘s view largely 
carried the day on the Supreme Court as most of federal criminal procedure came to be 
incorporated even while the Supreme Court also used the Fourteenth Amendment as a font of 
unenumerated rights. 
Justice Brennan‘s views were sharply criticized, however, by Justice William Rehnquist and 
later Justice Antonin Scalia in a series of dissenting opinions.  Rehnquist and Scalia directed 
their most withering fire at the notion of substantive due process.  They argued that the only 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those that are deeply rooted in history and 





 and Justice Alito followed this approach in incorporating the 
Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago.
192
  Justice Thomas declined to join Alito‘s 
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opinion because he would have correctly based incorporation on the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. 
The bottom line, today, is that the Supreme Court has mostly backed away from 
unenumerated rights substantive due process of the kind Justice Brennan has favored, and it has 
adhered to its past precedents where it has already explicitly incorporated criminal procedure 
rights against the States.  The Court has gone out of its way, however, to avoid any further 
application of the federal criminal procedure rights in the first eight amendments to the States.  
The Court has declined to grant certiorari in cases where it has been asked to impose a twelve 
rather than six person criminal jury trial right on the States.  It also has shown no interest in 
forcing the States to indict only by a grand jury or to use jury trial in civil cases.  The Court has 
also pruned back its understanding of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the Fifth 
Amendment Miranda warning to allow for greater state experimentation in these areas.  From 
the late 1970‘s down to the present day, the U.S. Supreme Court has so thoroughly backed off in 




D.   The Right Answer 
So what is the right answer to the question of what limits Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes on the States?  The original history suggests that lots of rights were 
protected but none of them very much.  Justice Frankfurter‘s approach is unhelpful because he 
discounts the importance of Anglo-American procedural rights that the Framers of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment thought were fundamental.  Justice Black‘s approach fails because it 
does not explain how the Fourteenth Amendment protected the common law rights of free 
African-Americans.  And, Justice Brennan‘s approach seems ad hoc and led to a virulent right to 
abortion in Roe v. Wade which the nation is still troubled by thirty-eight years later. 
We think all of the three approaches taken by Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Brennan have 
something to recommend them when we look at them in terms of the economics of federalism 
and of subsidiarity.  Justice Frankfurter‘s instinct that rights of freedom of speech, political 
participation, and anti-discrimination were more fundamental than criminal procedural rights is 
we think entirely sound.  John Hart Ely‘s work in Democracy and Distrust shows that freedom 
of speech and of the press; one person, one vote; freedom of religion; and protection against all 
forms of discrimination are essential if the States are to function effectively as democracies.
194
  
The Supreme Court is most effective when it sticks to policing rights of political participation 
and anti-discrimination rights, and it is most likely to get itself into political trouble when it 
prescribes a federal code of abortion law or of criminal procedure which the States must follow.  
This is part of the insight of footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co.
195
 
This emphatically does NOT mean that criminal procedure rights or rights to liberty of 
contract or to bodily integrity are not fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
They are.  What it does mean is that in figuring out which exercise of the police power are ―just‖ 
efforts to legislate to promote ―the general good of the whole [people]‖ we have to look at our 
practice from 1868 to the present day and perhaps even to the practice in other western 
constitutional democracies.  Whatever people might have thought in 1868 about the proper scope 
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of the police power, we know today that we must be far more cautious about police power 
interferences with freedom of speech or of the press than we need to be concerned about six 
person criminal juries or a sixty hour work week limit for bakers.  The Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not protect fundamental rights absolutely.  In their world, all rights were fairly 
easily trumped by the police power.  We know better thanks to 143 years of practice living under 
the Fourteenth Amendment since 1868.  We know that rights of political participation and anti-
discrimination rights ought only to be trumped where there is the most compelling of 
governmental interest while many other rights are properly protected only by rational basis 
scrutiny.  Other rights such as the right to a criminal jury trial in state cases get middle level 
scrutiny which is why six person juries are OK at the state level but are not OK at the federal 
level. 
Justice Hugo Black‘s approach to incorporation had the advantage that it led him to dissent in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,
196
 a case which foreshadowed the calamity of Roe v. Wade.  Justice 
Black was very aware of the mistakes that Supreme Court justices enforcing their own ideas 
about fundamental justice could cause.  But Justice Black had no theory that was rooted in the 
1860‘s as to why he gave First Amendment rights such elevated protection while not recognizing 
economic liberties as being protected at all.  There is more evidence from 1868 that tends to 
suggest the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment cared about economic liberty than there is 
evidence to suggest they cared about free expression.  Justice Black‘s theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is thus more deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the Court Packing Fight of 
the 1930‘s than it is rooted in the civil rights struggles of the 1860‘s. 
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Justice William Brennan‘s selective incorporation approach had the advantage that it could 
explain why the Fourteenth Amendment recognized so many rights, including criminal 
procedure rights, but it suffered from the disadvantage that he gave insufficient weight to the 
State‘s police power that could trump fundamental right.  Justice Brennan‘s nemesis former 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, on the other hand, gave too much weight to the police 
power and was insufficiently protective of fundamental rights.  As is often the case, the correct 
answer lay somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. 
E.   McDonald v. City of Chicago  
So what does all of this indicate with respect to the recent Supreme Court opinion 
incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth so that it now applies against the 
States?  Was the Court right to strike down Chicago‘s ban on gun ownership?  Did Justice 
Alito‘s plurality opinion analyze the issues correctly or did Justice Thomas‘s concurrence or 
Justice Stevens‘ or Breyer‘s dissents analyze the issues correctly? 
We think the majority was right to strike down the Chicago ban on gun ownership.  To begin 
with, there is no question, in our view, but that the right to keep and bear arms is deeply rooted in 
English and American history and tradition.  Both Justice Alito‘s plurality opinion and Justice 
Thomas‘s concurrence clearly prove as much.  Moreover, the right to own guns has traditionally 
been viewed as being a political right in American law.  We have a right to own guns at least in 
part because it protects our liberty as against the government.  We may also have a right to 
defend ourselves and to hunt but a key part of the right to keep and bear arms is political.  A 
local or state law that completely deprives the citizenry of any right to even own a gun is not a 
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―just‖ law enacted for ―the general good of the whole [people]‖ in light of American history and 
tradition. 
Would other regulations of the right to keep and bear arms such as laws that prohibit 
concealed carry in schools or other public places be constitutional?  We would have to analyze 
these issues one by one as they arose with careful attention to the facts of each case.  Some kinds 
of guns are more dangerous today than guns were in 1791 or 1868.  Fundamental rights can be 
regulated, and even the First Amendment is subject to a time, place, and manner restriction.  We 
think it is permissible in our legal tradition to outlaw machine guns, privately owned tanks, heat-
seeking missiles, and other military weapons.  On the other hand, state governments cannot 
under the guise of regulation render the right to own a gun totally meaningless. 
F.   The Margin of Appreciation 
There is a doctrine in European law that is related to the concept of subsidiarity which the 
European Court of Human Rights invokes in deciding cases under the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  That doctrine is one that recognizes that large continental human rights courts 
have to tolerate some reasonable diversity of enforcement among the member units of any such 
federation.  The European Court of Human Rights calls this sphere of ―live and let live‖ 
toleration a ―margin of appreciation.‖197  The margin of appreciation is the fudge factor by which 
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the European Court of Human Rights allows some of the forty-seven member countries to 
deviate from international human rights norms.   
The idea of a margin of appreciation is somewhat less rights protective than is the idea of 
subsidiarity because the former is a doctrine of judicial deference while the later is a theory of 
federalism.
198
  Nonetheless, the margin of appreciation doctrine has come to be recognized as a 
foundational feature of European Human Rights law.  The margin of appreciation doctrine could 
be described as a federalism discount extended by some national or international courts whereby 
some regions are allowed to vary from the approach followed by other regions in the 
enforcement of rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights invoked the margin of appreciation concept in two 
striking instances in recent years.  First, in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, the European Court of Human 
Rights allowed Turkey to ban the wearing of an Islamic headscarf in major educational 
institutions notwithstanding the European Convention‘s protection of religious freedom.199  The 
Court reasoned that Turkey faced unusual threats from militant Islamists, and it thus concluded 
that Turkey had the right to ban the wearing of a headscarf in schools even if in other countries 
that right might be protected.  Second, in Lautsi v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights 
also upheld an Italian state policy of displaying crucifixes on the walls of classroom in state run 
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  Once again, the state action was challenged as impairing religious freedom and once 
again the European Court of Human Rights invoked the margin of appreciation to recognize the 
cultural importance of the crucifix and of Catholicism to Italy. 
We think these cases make a lot of sense for a Human Rights Court that seeks to protect 
human rights in the forty-seven member Council of Europe.  The Council includes an incredibly 
diverse collection of nations some of which are very secular while others are quite traditional and 
religious.  The Council‘s members include countries with Protestant, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, 
and Islamic majorities, and it seems highly likely that tastes, cultural preferences, and real world 
conditions vary sharply among the Council of Europe‘s 47 member nations.  The failure by the 
European Court of Human Rights to embrace a margin of appreciation would be more likely to 
torpedo efforts at international human rights protection in Europe than it would be to get 
crucifixes removed from classroom walls.  Moreover, some cultural variation among the member 
countries ought to be viewed as being no more threatening than the prevalence of different 
languages and cultures among these countries.  European human rights law bans all across the 
continent of Europe:  1) the death penalty, 2) water-boarding, and 3) denials of gay rights to have 
sexual relationships.  It is thus hard to see much of a threat to European constitutional freedoms 
coming from the allowance of national flexibility as to public displays of a religious sort.  This is 
especially true since the European Court of Human Rights did for example protect the right of 
Jehovah‘s Witnesses aggressively to proselytize in Kokkinakis v. Greece.201  
Strikingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently taken a similar margin of appreciation 
approach to issues of religious endorsement.  In Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 
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the Supreme Court made it substantially harder for taxpayers who object to public religiosity to 
get standing to sue in such cases.
202
  The Court held that taxpayers did not have standing to sue 
to block the provision of tax credits by a state to individuals who donate to school tuition 
organizations which then provide scholarships to students attending religious schools.  This case 
built on a 2007 opinion in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation
203
 where the Supreme 
Court held that taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen
204
 to challenge government religiosity 
does not apply when the taxpayer is challenging discretionary executive branch action instead of 
a legislative appropriation.  Taken together, the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Hein and in Winn 
suggest that the Court is moving sharply to cut back on taxpayer standing to object to public 
displays of religiosity. 
We think this is a salutary development.  Tastes and cultural preferences vary widely across 
the United state just as they vary widely among the 47 members of the Council of Europe.  Parts 
of the United States are very religious, while other parts are quite secular.  It makes sense to 
leave state governments and federal executive branch personnel some freedom to engage in 
religious speech or to facilitate the funding of religious schools so long as the state does not 
discriminate against people as to their religion and so long as it does not mandate an official state 
church whose clergy are taxpayer funded.  Federalism concerns call for a margin of appreciation 
to be given here to the state just as the European Court of Human Rights recognizes in Europe. 
More fundamentally, we think the margin of appreciation idea counsels against the U.S. 
Supreme Court handing down substantive due process decisions like the decision in Roe v. Wade 
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creating a hitherto unknown and highly specific constitutional right to an abortion.  Federal 
substantive due process is only appropriate where:  1) the right in question is very deeply rooted 
in American history and tradition such that evidence of it can be seen as long ago as 1868 when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; and 2) where the state police power justification for 
regulating a right seems plainly excessive.  This suggests that the Supreme Court got things right 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago, but it got things wrong in Roe v. Wade.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, we hope we have been able to shed some light on why federalism and 
subsidiarity are both very important concepts when viewed from the perspective of law.  
Specifically, the European constitutional ideas of subsidiarity and a margin of appreciation are in 
our view directly relevant to U.S. constitutional law.  The ―substantial effects‖ test of United 
States v. Lopez is neither more originalist nor is it more law-like than is the idea of subsidiarity, 
as illumination by a consideration of the economics of federalism.  Similarly, the question of 
when and to what degree the concept of the police power ought to be allowed to trump 
fundamental rights in the Fourteenth Amendment context is quite indeterminate.  Borrowing 
ideas like the margin of appreciation from European law well worth considering. 
The bottom line is that federalism remains very important in U.S. constitutional law as will 
be shown when the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of President Obama‘s national 
healthcare law and as was shown last summer in McDonald v. City of Chicago.  On Friday, June 
16, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a federalism decision in which Justice Anthony 
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M. Kennedy described the importance of federalism.  We close with this quotation for Justice 
Kennedy‘s opinion for the Court: 
Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary 
between different institutions of government for their own 
integrity. . . . Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons 
within a state by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated 
governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. . . . By 
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the 
concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the 
individual from arbitrary power. When government acts in excess 
of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake. . . . The limitations that 
federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging 
only to the States. States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of 
federalism. . . . An individual has a direct interest in objecting to 
laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National 
Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws 
causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity 
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